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The regulatory response to financial innovation 
 




The credit crisis triggered profound changes in financial markets and institutions. Sine it 
started, regulators have sought to address the systemic failure that led to it.  They have 
named, shamed and fined the guilty parties (see table). That said, regulators have yet to 
fundamentally question their own failure to keep pace with financial innovation. They 
should not forget that it was the creation and promotion of new financial instruments, 
technologies and business models that sowed the seeds of the crisis.   Unless we become 
more pro-active in regulating them, we are set to repeat the mistakes of the past in novel 
new ways. 
 
The response to the crisis prompted wide ranging regulatory change in both Europe and the 
United States.  Some of the response was for the better.  The point, however, is that it was a 
kneejerk reaction and not supported by critical analysis.  There was little research into how 
the changes would impact capital markets.   
 
There has also been little debate on what differentiates good regulation from bad (or overly 
onerous). Academia has a clear role to play in answering this question and in bridging the 
gap. It can do this through empirical evaluation and robust testing.  After all, it was asset 
pricing research that led to the very innovation that now requires regulation.  The academic 
body of knowledge, as encapsulated in the CISI exam syllabus, shaped capital markets into 
what they are today.   
 
The credit crisis started because of issues in the sub-prime lending and securitization 
markets. That said, the two common denominators that made the crisis systemic were 
financial engineering and deregulation.  The lesson that should be learnt is that regulation 
has to keep pace with financial innovation in order to accommodate free functioning capital 
markets. 
If one wants to see how rapidly innovation is occurring, one only needs to look to what has 







creation of a global crypto-currency.  When (rather than if) this happens, payments and 
financial transactions will move to an instantaneous settlement basis.  Regulators will have 
ƚŽďĞƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ ?/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƐŚƵƚƚŚĞŐĂƚĞĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŚŽƌƐĞŚĂƐďŽůƚĞĚ ?ŽƌŝŶƚŚŝƐ
case the trade settled.  
It is not just digital money that is changing.  Any product that can be traded can become 
financialized.  Consider carbon credits and energy trading for example. Indeed, data of any 
kind is an  “asset ? that has  “value ?.  New products will be based on these, such as the oft 
cited  “cloud ?. These will have to accommodate mainstream markets.  They will have to be 
monitored and regulated.  
Meanwhile, the internet is changing the world.  It is not just secondary markets that are 
evolving.  Primary markets are also being impacted.  Crowd-funding, for example, is an area 
in which developments are currently outpacing the regulators.   There is a need to keep up 
with both the digitalization and financialization of industries. Look at what is happening to 
investment in art markets or developments in derivatives on the weather.  Further change is 
on the way. 
The pace that regulators adapt to innovation is important because theory suggests the 
regulatory process as one of competition among interest groups.  This suggests that 
financial institutions, who are likely to receive concentrated gains from regulation, are 
typically more effective at lobbying for their interests than investors or savers. This can 
distort markets. There is therefore a need to provide an independent and impartial 
advocate to promote the best interests of capital markets in the face of new financial 
innovation. 
Clearly, the pace of change is fast.  The crisis revealed many systemic problems arising from 
ƐŽĐĂůůĞĚƐŚĂĚŽǁďĂŶŬŝŶŐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?^ƵĐŚ “ĐƌĞĚŝƚŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? came from innovation.  In 
effect, financial markets created entities and activities outside the regular banking system.  
This is another area of innovation that has to be addressed. 
In the same vein, new and novel strategies are being devised. These come from new areas, 
such as Behavioral Finance and Neuroeconomics.  Regulators do not fully understand them 
but and responsible for their oversight.  Systems, product design, investment process and 
measurement will all change.  Even our very concept of risk (their proxies, variance and 
standard deviation) is being revisited. 
Regulation should not just be about making law and enforcing it.  It must support trust and 
confidence. This is particularly true in the financial services sector and for its participants. 
Adoption of new rules and oversight should be done in conjunction with the development of 
a strong culture of ethics, a focus on clients and a respect for fiduciary interest. It should 
promote skills other than just make boxes for people to tick. 
Some may question whether academic research can fill the gap.  Many practitioners 







Let us not forget that academic theories have changed the world of finance.  A large part of 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůůǇŵĂŶĂŐĞĚŵŽŶĞǇŝƐŝŶĚĞǆĞĚ ?dŚĞƌďŝƚƌĂŐĞWƌŝĐŝŶŐ Theory gave 
birth to factor based risk evaluation.  The Black Scholes options pricing model underpins the 
derivatives markets.  Capital decisions, firm structure and the amount of leverage a firm 
should optimally be based on theory. Thanks to academic models it is generally agreed that 
there is a mathematical relationship between risk and return.   
Practioners argue that individuals are not rational, markets are not frictionless, information 
is not ubiquitous and data normally distributed.  They are to some extent right. Theoretic 
research does not take account of asymmetric information, trading costs, liquidity and tax.  
That said, it is robust and its conclusions are statistically based. Even so, research often pits 
academia against the world of active asset managers.  This is because theoretical academics 
tend to be too dismissive of the persistence of risk adjusted investment outperformance.  It 
is a grey zone that needs to be more clearly delineated.  Not everyone can be passive 
participants in financial markets. 
Despite all this, market efficiency is an important element in finance.  Regulators need to 
worry about it because it is the backbone of finance.  It provides the basis for price 
discovery and the continuous restructuring of the economy. Well run markets support 
economic growth and facilitates capitalism. On a similar note, sound implementation of 
financial theory improves the efficiency of capital decisions, thereby favoring a better 
allocation of scarce economic resources.   
Current issues, such as governance and internal corporate capital allocation, particularly in 
respect of pay and incentives, are even more immediate.  The role of institutional investors 
is under scrutiny and regulators have taken note.  Once again academia can step upto the 
plate.  Research designed to improve institutional investor involvement and shareholder 
participation is needed.  The billions of dollars of fines paid by the banks are testimony to 
the importance of getting governance right.   
As has been said, academics can help policy-makers, regulators, and finance industry 
professionals address the issues pertinent to financial regulation and innovation. They need 
to be the strategic link between policy-makers, regulators and other financial industry 
participants.  In this way, research insights into financial regulations, banking policies, risk 
management, investment benchmarks and corporate governance can be adopted by capital 
markets.  This can be done with investigation and appropriate comment; especially on policy 
matters that relate to global financial markets in general and in the United Kingdom and the 
European Union in particular. After all, peer reviewed theoretical research drives both 
growth and innovation in the financial sector.  It can assist government, regulators and 
industry.  The aim should be utilize it to anticipate appropriate industry structures, 







In conclusion, with financial innovation happening at such a fast pace, there needs to be 
timely, economic, industry and social arguments for any change in regulatory oversight.  
There is a need for new rules, based on innovation that involves either leverage, derivatives 
or risk models. These must be developed with a better understanding of their impact.  More 










Description 2015 Q3 2015 Q2 2015 Q1 2014 Q4 2014 Q3 2014 Q2 2014 Q1 2013 Q4 2013 Q3 2013 Q2 2013 Q1
Reasonably Possible Litigation Costs Beyond Current Reserves 24010 25632 23726 22013 22260.87 25800.22 26206.68 27098.23 26093.58 24409.63 22686.99
    U.S. Banks 19148 20178 18230 17771 18857 20292 20738 22324 21902 20418 19123
        JPMorgan Chase & Co 5000 5500 5500 5800 5900 4600 4500 5000 5700 6800 6000
        Citigroup Inc 4000 4000 4000 4000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
        Goldman Sachs Group Inc/The 5300 5900 3800 3000 2500 3200 3700 3600 4000 3500 3500
        Bank of America Corp 2400 2300 2500 2700 3100 5000 5000 6100 5100 2800 2600
        Wells Fargo & Co 1400 1400 1200 1100 950 1200 911 951 951 1100 1100
        PNC Financial Services Group I 725 725 725 650 750 725 725 800 425 400 400
        SunTrust Banks Inc 160 170 170 180 300 200 350 300 250 400 350
        US Bancorp* 200 200 200 200
        Regions Financial Corp 40 40 160 160 170 180 100 100 90 60 60
        Fifth Third Bancorp 51 60 103 105 103 104 117 113 116 88 73
        Comerica Inc 32 43 32 36 44 43 85 110
        M&T Bank Corp 40 40 40 40 40 40 50 50 70 70 40
        * USB "immaterial" excess legal
        cost after 1Q14
    European Banks 4862 5454 5496 4242 3403.869 5508.219 5468.677 4774.225 4191.582 3991.633 3563.993
        Deutsche Bank AG 2892 3542 3605 2431 2146.93 4380.894 2754.359 2070 1759.03 1560.6 1666.86
        Credit Suisse Group AG 1970 1912 1891 1811 1256.939 1127.325 2714.318 2704.225 2432.552 2431.033 1897.133
Litigation Expense
Mortgage Repurchases
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation
Notable Fines 5400 5400 23700 9000 13000 20600
    Deutsche Bank 2100
    Barclays 2000
    Citigroup 1300 7000
    Morgan Stanley 2600
    Standard & Poors 1400
    Commerzbank 1400
    Bank of America 16700 11600
    BNP Paribas 9000
    JPMorgan 13000
    Mortgage Servicing Settlement
    Foreclosure Settlement 9000
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financial market participants. 
